#4 Winter 1989

     The Corporate Veil v. the Environment
     For the Good of Whom?
     A Modest Tax Break
     Pro Life?
     Right to Die
     Those Dangerous Korean Manicure Shop Owners!
     Without Property Rights . . .
     Did We Hear Correctly?

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TAFOL's draft of its position paper on the issue of mandatory pro bono is printed below. The position paper will soon be submitted to the committee in New York State which has recommended the implementation of mandatory pro bono, and to the New York State Bar Association, which opposes mandatory pro bono. TAFOL members are urged to notify TAFOL of any developments in their states which would make submission to a bar organization or legislative body in that state appropriate.



Historically, lawyers (like many other professionals) have contributed their professional efforts to help those who could not afford their services. This is called pro bono publico service, from the Latin "for the public good." In recent years, there have been proposals to make this form of charity mandatory. The proposals would require lawyers to render services to the poor as a condition of continuing licensure, independently of the lawyers' desires,
even if they have moral objections to the service or find
the work or the client abhorrent for other reasons. The work would be compelled without compensation, or for compensation insufficient to induce the lawyer to offer his services voluntarily. A lawyer who refused to serve would lose his right to practice his profession.

The proponents of mandatory pro bono believe that it is a golden, noble ideal, pure in principle. Most opponents accept this premise, but regard mandatory pro bono as unworkable in practice. The Association for Objective Law ("TAFOL") agrees that mandatory pro bono will not work. However, its main objection is more fundamental. TAFOL holds that mandatory pro bono is immoral, inimical to basic American principles, and subject to fatal constitutional objections.

I. The Mandatory Pro Bono Movement

The notion of mandatory pro bono has received serious, widespread consideration over the past several years. In New York, for example, The Committee to Improve the Availability of Legal Services was appointed by Chief Justice Sol Wachtler to investigate, among other things, implementing mandatory pro bono. Based on an alleged "growing need for legal services for the poor"2 and a "disappointingly low" percentage of lawyers volunteering their services to the poor, the Committee is urging the adoption of the "modest" requirement that every New York lawyer be required to devote at least 40 hours every two years to public service. (Certain attorneys could avoid service by making a monetary payment, others by transferring their obligations to another attorney.) This plan is opposed by the New York State Bar Association, which suggests an alternative based on lawyers volunteering their services.

In other jurisdictions, different approaches have been taken. A new set of Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct adopted by vote of Texas lawyers in May 1989 replaces the word "should" with the word "shall" in a section dealing with a lawyer's obligation to serve when appointed by a tribunal, thus giving courts the right to conscript lawyers in individual cases. In Maryland, a select committee headed by Congressman Benjamin Cardin recommended

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that lawyers be required to take one pro bono case per year. However, the Maryland Court of Appeals shelved the recommendation pending results of a statewide survey of voluntary pro bono efforts. As for the federal courts, in Mallard v. United States District Court, 109 S. Ct. 1814 (1989), the Supreme Court addressed 28 U.S.C. §1915(d), which allows a court to request a lawyer to handle a case for an indigent litigant. Although the Court (in a five to four decision) rejected the idea that this statute can be used to require pro bono services, it declined to express an opinion as to whether federal courts have inherent power to force lawyers to provide legal services.

In addition, movement towards mandatory pro bono (ranging from murmurs of support to organized activity) has been reported in Florida, Hawaii, Illinois, Louisiana, Massachusetts, North Dakota, Oregon and Wisconsin.

II. Mandatory Pro Bono is Immoral, Unconstitutional and Impracticable

A. Mandatory Pro Bono Contravenes the Moral and Political Principles Upon Which the
     United States Is Based

The ethical basis of mandatory pro bono is the notion that an individual has no right to his own life but rather has a moral duty to live for others and sacrifice his own values to their wishes and needs. But the United States is, properly, rooted in another ethics. The United States was founded on the principle that every individual should and may act in his own self interest and by his own judgment, so long as he allows others to do the same. The profound political principle which implements this ethical principle, and which has made the United States the freest country on earth, is the principle of individual rights.

The fundamental right is the right to life, but this means more than freedom from an arbitrary firing squad. Life is a process of self-sustaining and self-generating action. The right to life means "the freedom to take all the actions required by the nature of a rational being for the support, the furtherance, the fulfillment and the enjoyment of his life."3 The right to life implies the right to earn, use and dispose of property. "[T]he man who has no right to the product of his effort has no means to sustain his life. The man who produces while others dispose of his product, is a slave."4 The right to life also implies a right to the pursuit of happiness, which means the right to live for oneself and choose what constitutes one's own private happiness and to work for its achievement as one sees fit.

In the language of the Declaration of Independence: "We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness. That to secure these rights, Governments are instituted among Men . . . "

Rights are inalienable; they are absolute. There are no circumstances under which a right may be infringed. There can be no rights if they may, at the discretion or whim of the government or the majority, be invaded in any way, at any time, to any degree. Once such an invasion is permitted, the notion of something superior to the rights of the individual has been accepted.

The arguments for mandatory pro bono are hostile to these principles. It is often suggested that the indigent have a right to legal services, that this "right" conflicts with the rights of lawyers to choose the work they wish to do and to refuse to work for free, and so the rights of lawyers must yield to some degree. But rights pertain to freedom of action. A man has a right to free speech, but not a right to commandeer someone else's radio station. A man has the right to work to earn enough money to buy a house and actually to buy that house if someone wishes to sell it to him. He has no right to a house such that someone else is required to provide it to him. Likewise, a man has the right to engage a lawyer to represent him. That is not at all the same thing as the notion of a "right" to legal services which would entitle that man (or the government on his behalf) to force a lawyer to represent him for free. Needs are not rights, and no supposed need of the indigent for legal services can justify any violation of a lawyer's rights.

Proponents of mandatory pro bono argue alternatively that along with rights go obligations. They say that a right - in this case the right to practice law - is a grant of the government.5 Since it is a grant, they believe, certain duties may be demanded in return - in this case the duty to meet the needs of the indigent for legal services. But the very essence of the concept of rights is that individuals may act by right, without anyone's permission. That is the meaning of freedom. Permissions may be withdrawn at whim, at any time. The only "obligation" of an individual in society is "to respect the rights of others, if one wishes one's own

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rights to be recognized and protected."6

A proper government protects the rights of lawyers to act and work as they wish. Under mandatory pro bono, government would do just the reverse; it would treat rights
as conditional gifts and, in the name of the "needs of the indigent," command: "Work for him."

Once any bogus right is proclaimed, once rights are demoted to permissions and the absolutism of rights is breached, there can be no limit to the number of counterfeit rights that can be concocted and which will require "adjustment" of the actual rights of others: rights to free dental care or mechanical work, rights to cars and houses and VCRs. Inevitably, actual rights are swamped and drowned for everyone, the needy and the not. How ironic and tragic it would be if, at the same time the people of Eastern Europe are struggling to break the chains of communism, the heirs of Jefferson were to declare: "From each according to his abilities, to each according to his needs."

B. Mandatory Pro Bono Is Unconstitutional

Mandatory pro bono offends several provisions of the United States Constitution.

First, the Fifth Amendment prohibits the taking of private property for public use without just compensation. A lawyer's time and effort constitute his stock in trade---his property. Thus any government edict that denies him full payment for his services is unconstitutional. DeLisio v. Alaska Superior Court, 740 P.2d 437 (Alaska 1987); State ex rel. Scott v. Roper, 688 S.W.2d 757 (Mo. 1985); Bedford v. Salt Lake County, 22 Utah 2d 12, 447 P.2d 193 (1968).

Second, the Thirteenth Amendment states: "Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude . . . shall exist within the United States or any place subject to their jurisdiction." Although the Thirteenth Amendment has traditionally been viewed as not affording protection from temporary service coerced by the government, the broad language of the amendment---and, indeed, common sense---suggest that mandatory pro bono is involuntary servitude. That was the reaction of the court in one case in which a lawyer appointed pursuant to statute to represent a person in a sanity hearing was denied payment. The court in that case stated: "For the legislature to attempt to compel a lawyer to work by passing a statute requiring a judge to order it done would be to take his property without giving just compensation, or to impose a form of involuntary servitude upon him." Bedford v. Salt Lake County, 447 P.2d at 194-95.

As stated in a classic dissent: "The words 'involuntary servitude' . . . include something more than slavery in the strict sense of the term; they include also serfage vassalage, villenage, peonage, and all other forms of compulsory service for the mere benefit or pleasure of others." Slaughter-House Cases, 82 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 90 (1873) (Field, J., dissenting).

Third, the First Amendment right of free speech includes both the right to refrain from speaking at all and the right to refuse to advocate positions with which the speaker disagrees. Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977); West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943). By requiring a lawyer to support positions or governmental activities to which he is opposed (rent control or the welfare system, for example), mandatory pro bono violates this right.

Finally, mandatory pro bono would violate the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by singling out lawyers to provide special contributions (in time or money) to support the poor. See Cunningham v. Superior Court, 177 Cal. App. 3d 336, 222 Cal. Rptr. 854 (1986). On what basis can the public declare that it refuses to suffer taxation to provide legal services to the poor and yet impose this burden on just one segment of the population, namely lawyers?

(To be continued in the next issue of the Newsletter.)

1.The Association for Objective Law is a national organization formed in 1988. Its members are lawyers, law students and others who wish to advance Objectivism, the philosophy of Ayn Rand, as the basis of a proper legal system. The Association for Objective Law currently has members in 15 states and 7 foreign countries.

2. The mandatory pro bono movement assumes that many poor in the United States have legitimate unmet legal needs, and that volunteer service by lawyers is insufficient to fulfill those needs. TAFOL takes no position here as to whether a high level of such legitimate unmet legal needs truly exists. TAFOL's position is that voluntary service is the only appropriate way to meet whatever needs do exist.

3. Ayn Rand, "Man's Rights," in The Virtue of Selfishness, 124 (1964).

4. Id. at 125.

5. TAFOL does not address here the propriety of government licensing of lawyers. However, under current law, the government has no power to deny a license where the applicant is qualified. Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232, 238-39 (1957). Thus, the fact that a lawyer is licensed in no

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way implies that he has been granted a "privilege" by the government to practice law.

6. Ayn Rand, "The Wreckage of the Consensus," in Capitalism: The Unknown Ideal, 227 (1966).


Several TAFOL members have requested that they be given an opportunity to read TAFOL's charter. In response to these requests and for the general information of our membership, we publish it here in its entirety. [The Charter was amended from time to time.]


Article I - Name and Purpose

We, the undersigned, hereby form THE ASSOCIATION FOR OBJECTIVE LAW. The purpose of the Association is to advance Objectivism, the philosophy of Ayn Rand, as the basis of a proper legal system.

Article II - Membership and Contributions

Section 1. There will be three kinds of members: full members, student members and associate members. A full member must be licensed to practice law in at least one jurisdiction. Student membership is open to students in a program leading to licensure to practice law. All other members will be associate members.
Section 2. Each full member and associate member shall, once every year, contribute dues in an amount and by a date to be determined by the Board of Directors.

Article III - Board of Directors

Section 1. All powers of The Association shall be vested
in a Board of Directors consisting of at least three full members of the Association.
Section 1.1. The Board may designate certain officers,
and appoint committees with such powers and under such terms and conditions, as the Board may determine.
Section 1.2. The Board may fill any vacancies in its own membership.
Section 1.3. Board meetings may be conducted in person or by telephone.
Section 1.4. A regular meeting of the Board will be held during the first two weeks of August of every year, at which time the Board will elect its successors. Immediately upon election, all powers shall devolve upon the new Board. All officers shall be elected from among the membership by the new Board at its first meeting.
Section 1.5. Any Board member may be removed by a majority vote of the remaining members.
Section 2. Any public statement made by or on behalf of the Association must be approved by unanimous action of the Board. Approval of a majority of the Board is sufficient for any other action.

Article IV - Officers

Section 1. The Association shall have the following officers: president, vice-president, secretary, and treasurer. Any officer may hold two posts, except that the president and vice-president may not be the same person.
Section 1.1. The president shall preside at meetings of the Board and membership meetings.
Section 1.2. The vice-president shall act in place of the president in case of resignation, inability or refusal of the latter to act.
Section 1.3. The secretary shall be the custodian of all records, other than those specifically entrusted to another officer. The secretary shall keep a true record of the proceedings of all meetings of the Association and of the Board.
Section 1.4. The treasurer shall be authorized to receive and disburse funds of the Association as determined by the Board and shall keep a true record of all monies received and disbursed and report thereon to the Board at reasonable intervals.
Section 2. All officers shall be elected by and serve at the pleasure of the Board.

Article V - Amendment

The Board may amend this Charter by majority vote.

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Article VI - Miscellaneous

Section 1. The first Board shall consist of the undersigned. It shall assume powers beginning on the last date on which this document is signed below.
Section 2. The Association's fiscal year shall be the calendar year.
Section 3. The Association shall not engage in the practice of law.

Article VII - Termination

Section 1. The Association may be terminated by the Board.
Section 2. Upon termination, the assets of the Association, if any, shall be disposed of as follows:
Section 2.1. First, such assets shall be applied to any indebtedness of the Association, including any indebtedness to officers.
Section 2.2. Second, any assets remaining after Section 2.1 above shall be paid to The Ayn Rand Institute should such Institute exist at the time the Association is terminated. If such Institute shall not exist at such time, then such assets shall be paid to such other organization which is exempt from federal income tax as the Board shall determine.

Article VIII - Adoption

We, the undersigned, hereby adopt the above as the Charter of THE ASSOCIATION FOR OBJECTIVE LAW.

The Charter was signed on various dates in August and September of 1988 by Arline Mann, Stephen Plafker, Sandra Jo Franklin, and Margaret D. Tagliavia. It has been amended several times since.


The Corporate Veil v. the Environment

Bad law spreads. Problems generated by a new environmental law are providing an occasion for courts to attack the most important principle of corporate law: limited shareholder liability.

The traditional rule is that shareholders in corporations (including controlling shareholders that are parent corporations) have limited liability. This means that a shareholder risks only the amount of his investment unless he has personally participated in wrong-doing. If a shareholder owns $100 worth of stock in a corporation, he may lose his $100, but he will generally not be held liable if, for example, the company car hits a pedestrian and the corporation has insufficient assets to compensate the pedestrian. Only in certain limited situations - where the separation between the parent and the subsidiary is a sham - do courts "pierce the corporate veil" to hold shareholders liable for corporate acts. Limited liability is essential for encouraging investment; investors must be confident that they do not risk everything they own simply buying stock in a corporation.

The federal government and several states are arguing that this rule should be changed in the case of companies that have generated, transported or stored hazardous waste. Federal Superfund law requires these companies to clean up this waste, whether or not their actions with respect to the waste were illegal when performed. The federal government and various states claim that enforcement of the Superfund law will be frustrated unless parent corporations are made responsible for the actions of their subsidiaries. The Wall Street Journal reports: "The catalyst for the challenge is the staggering cost of toxic-waste cleanups under the Superfund law, which the Environmental Protection Agency has estimated will approach $100 billion." Several federal district courts have already ruled that relaxed "piercing" standards should be applied under the Superfund law. According to the report, the courts have "ignored entreaties by the corporations that decades of state law and court precedents were being undermined in the process." However, in one case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has ruled that parent companies are not responsible for the actions of their subsidiaries under the Superfund law, bucking what one defense lawyer in the case characterized as a trend in environmental law in general to disregard traditional corporate rules regarding limited liability of shareholders.

For the Good of Whom?

Many lawyers support mandatory pro bono. They are perfectly willing to force all lawyers to serve the alleged needs of the poor for legal services. How deep does this

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concern for the poor go?

There have been several recent reports of bar associations considering proposals to legitimize non-lawyer legal technicians. Such technicians would perform certain functions now performed only by licensed lawyers, presumably at lower prices. Clearly, this could be a boon for the poor, but the proposals have met with strong opposition, even outrage, from lawyers. Partly as a result of such opposition, the governing board of the California State Bar declined to endorse the idea of non-lawyer legal technicians, and instead buried the proposal - at least temporarily - under a ten-member commission charged with the task of studying the concept.

Apparently, where the choice is between the poor and a government-protected monopoly, the poor can wait.

A Modest Tax Break

Beginning January 1, 1990, taxpayers may purchase series EE United States savings bonds and exclude interest on the bonds from gross income if the bond proceeds are used to pay certain costs of higher education. This interest exclusion was enacted as a part of the Technical and Miscellaneous Revenue Act of 1988.

The amount of interest excludable is limited to the amount of bond redemption proceeds used to pay so-called "qualified higher education expenses" during the same tax year in which an EE bond is redeemed. "Qualified higher education expenses" are somewhat narrowly defined to include expenses for tuition and fees---apparently not room and board - at most public and nonprofit post--- secondary education institutions that are eligible for certain Federal assistance.

The benefit of the exclusion is available in its entirety to joint filers with modified adjusted gross incomes ("modified AGI") of $60,000 or less and to single filers with modified AGI's of $40,000 or less, but is phased out for joint filers with modified AGI's of between $60,000 and $90,000, and for single filers with modified AGI's between $40,000 and $55,000.

While this provision may be a sorry substitute for more vigorous proposals that could have been adopted, it is at least some good news on this front. (For a description of Miss Rand's proposal for a much more extensive program and a discussion of the reasons in support of such a program, see "Tax-Credits for Education," in the March 13, 1972, issue of The Ayn Rand Letter, Vol. 1, No. 12).

(The exclusion is described in greater detail in Internal Revenue Code Section 135; IRS Notice 90-7, 199-3 I.R.B. 5; and IRS Form 8818, "Optional Form to Record Redemption of College Savings Bonds."

Pro Life?

One of the cruelest instances of harassment by anti-abortionists involved the family of Nancy Klein, a comatose accident victim who, at the time of her accident, was 18 weeks pregnant with her second child. Doctors who examined Mrs. Klein held little hope she would emerge from her coma, though they agreed that an abortion could improve her chances. When Mrs. Klein's husband sought to gain legal guardianship of his 32-year-old wife and the right to decide to abort their child, he met the hard-fisted resistance of anti-abortionists who sought to enjoin the abortion. Thus, what began as a private family matter, difficult and heart-wrenching enough without the interference of outsiders, became a public battle, forcing Mr. Klein to fight anti-abortionists in three state courts and the United States Supreme Court. Ultimately, Mr. Klein prevailed and doctors at North Shore University Hospital in Manhassett, Long Island, performed an abortion on Mrs. Klein on February 11, 1989.

Recently, it was announced in The New York Times that Mrs. Klein has emerged from her coma, is able to talk, recognizes her family and is slowly regaining her memory. It appears that the abortion---which made a more aggressive medication and rehabilitation program possible ---may very well have been a significant factor in her recovery.

Whatever the effect on Mrs. Klein's recovery, the decision to abort the fetus should have been Mr. Klein's, not that of some meddlesome group whose pro-death motives have been made patently clear by its determination to stop Mrs. Klein's abortion at all costs, including the cost of her life.

Right to Die

In the summer issue of the newsletter, TAFOL reported that the United States Supreme Court would hear a case raising the question of whether family members, as
guardians of an incompetent ward, may demand that a
hospital cease providing food and water to the ward through a feeding tube. This question was argued before the Court on December 6, 1989.

The family of a 32-year-old woman, who has been lying in a persistent vegetative state for seven years, maintained that the woman, if she could come before

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the Court, would exercise a constitutionally protected liberty in favor of ending her life. Counsel for the State of Missouri argued against the family, stating that a state need not accept a family's statement of a patient's wishes as evidence of the patient's intent.

As of this printing, the Court's decision in the case has not been announced. Thus, it is unclear whether the outcome of the case will turn on the issue of whether there is a constitutionally protected right to die, or rather on the issue of what evidence of intent is required for a decision to be made to terminate life-sustaining care if a patient himself cannot make his desires known.

If the Court is agonizing over the latter question, we suggest the following formulation of the issue: By what right can a court compel anyone to bear the expense of medical care for another?

Recently, a Long Island judge met this question head-on. The judge ruled that a nursing home could not collect fees amounting to more than $100,000 for the care of a comatose woman whose family had asked the home to stop life-sustaining treatment. The nursing home had attempted to collect the fees from the family after the home was requested by the family to remove the woman's feeding tube.

Assuming that it was the family's resources which would have been used to pay the nursing home's fees, the judge's decision was the proper one. Who has the obligation to sustain a patient's life absent some indication from the patient that he is willing to die? The answer is simple---no one. Neither the family, nor the care facility, nor the state (i.e., taxpayers) can rightfully be compelled to do so. Put another way: Who should make the decision as to whether any medical care is discontinued as to any patient, comatose or fully competent? The person paying the bills. To require someone to pay such a toll even where he gains no value is immoral and vicious, since to do so is to destroy, most likely in great measure, the payor's quality of existence.

Those Dangerous Korean Manicure Shop Owners!

Government today tries to guarantee every citizen's happiness and well being rather than simply punish or step in to prevent particular violations of rights. As a consequence, across-the-board obligations and prohibitions have become the norm, and ridiculous results often obtain. One example: The New York Employee Polygraph Protection Act prohibits the administration of lie detector tests to employees except in very limited circumstances and requires employers to post a notice summarizing the provisions of the Act. The Act is wrong in itself as an invasion of private consensual relationships and property rights, but the absurdity of its universal application was especially apparent in one instance. A Korean manicure shop patronized by a TAFOL officer had, as required by law, tacked up a poster in English explaining the provisions of the Act. The shop had three Korean immigrant employees of a Korean immigrant employer; the employees understood very little English and did not seem to be in any grave danger of being polygraphed by anyone.

Without Property Rights . . .

In one of her most brilliant integrations, Ayn Rand stated: "Without property rights, no other rights can be practiced." The right to choose an abortion is one of the rights that cannot be practiced unless there are private doctors and private hospitals on private land. Yes, abortions can be and are performed in government-owned facilities. But access to such abortions is a privilege, not a right, as the United States Supreme

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Court made clear in Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 57 U.S.L.W. 5023 (1989).

In that case, the State of Missouri had made it unlawful for any "public facility" to be used for abortions not necessary to save the mother's life. Id. at 5027. "Public facility," in turn, was defined as "any public institution, public facility, public equipment, or any physical asset owned, leased, or controlled by this state or any agency or political subdivision thereof." Id. at 5036 n.1 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). By upholding the Missouri law, the Supreme Court ensured that:

     no abortion may be performed at Truman Medical Center in Kansas City---where,
     in 1985, 97 percent of all Missouri hospital abortions at 16 weeks or later were
     performed---even though the Center is a private hospital, staffed primarily by
     private doctors, and administered by a private corporation: the Center is located
     on ground leased from a political subdivision of the State.

Id. (emphasis added).

The holding in Webster underscores the need to prohibit governments from owning any more land than they require for their legitimate functions. When government is restricted to its legitimate functions, government ownership of land is no threat. But when we allow governments to become mixed-economy land moguls, with no limits on their acquisitiveness, we endanger the only practical means for individuals to exercise their rights, namely, private property.

In the words of Chief Justice Rehnquist, "Nothing in the Constitution requires States to enter or remain in the business of performing abortions." Id. at 5028. That being the case, the logical question is: Why should we permit the government to own the land under an abortion clinic?

Did We Hear Correctly?

At a recent meeting of the Tax Section of the American Bar Association, Congressman Bill Archer, ranking Republican member of the House Ways and Means Committee, publicly decried the use of the term "tax expenditure." This term appears frequently in the context of tax legislation where Congress has granted a tax benefit ---for example, where it has legislated tax credits for research and development. The idea is that the extension of such a benefit "costs" Uncle Sam money in the form of lost revenue.

Mr. Archer, however, takes exception to the use of the term. He stated at a Tax Section luncheon that the term was based on the faulty premise that the United States government owns the product of its citizens' labor and that when the government permits its citizens to retain a portion of their production, it does so at the expense of the United States Treasury. This, in Mr. Archer's view and ours, is simply wrong thinking.


Sandy Franklin has announced her resignation as a board member and as secretary of TAFOL. Sandy was an early advocate of establishing an organization of attorneys interested in Objectivism and was a central influence in the formation of TAFOL. TAFOL is grateful for Sandy's important contributions and pleased that she has expressed interest in continuing her membership in TAFOL and support of its activities.

Copyright © 1989 The Association for Objective Law. All rights reserved. The Association for Objective Law is a Missouri non-profit corporation whose purpose is to advance Objectivism, the philosophy of Ayn Rand, as the basis of a proper legal system.